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The Problem of Continuity in Chinese Businesses
in Southeast Asia
Kunio YOSHIHARA*
Chinese businesses and Chinese business-
I Introduction
If we follow Fernand Braudel's clas-
sification, the economy can be divided
into three sectors: capitalism, the mar-
ket economy, and the subsistence econ-
omy [Braudel 1979: introduction]. The
meaning of the third sector would be
self-explanatory: goods are produced for
the producer's own consumption. In the
market economy and capitalism, how-
ever, economic activities are undertaken
for the market; the difference between
the two is that in the former economic
activities are small-scale and utilize only
a small amount of capital, while in the
latter a large amount of capital is used
and the scale of operation is large. Cap-
italism is then the sector in which the
role of capital is pronounced.
Chinese businesses in this paper are
not just any types of business owned
and operated by the Chinese. I want to
treat only those in which substantial cap-
ital is involved, that is, those in capi-
talism. They may be called capitalist
institutions, and the people who own
them can be called capitalists, but here
they are usually called, respectively,
* alJj(~t:~, The Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University
men.
Southeast Asia is more narrowly de-
fined in this paper than usual. Since I
want to focus on the problem of busi-
ness continuity in the past several dec-
ades, I cover only the area where capital-
ism exists today as it did earlier--
which is the ASEAN region. It is some-
times maintained that capitalism exists
in Burma since private property exists
there, but since no concentration of cap-
ital exists in the Burmese private sec-
tor, I regard that it does not have capi-
talism.
The subject I want to treat is the fac-
tors affecting the continuity of Chinese
businesses. Businesses rise and fall, in
the developed countries as well as in
Southeast Asia. It is neither interesting
nor very meaningful to repeat the rea-
sons given for the developed countries,
so I want to focus on those which are
either unique to the region or more
pronounced there.
My focus is on Chinese businesses
rather than on business families. This dis-
tinction is not very meaningful under
some circumstances, but it needs to be
made, for a business can have a longer
life than a family. For example, a family
may decline, but the business it set
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up can continue its life under a different
ownership.
Businesses discussed in the paper were
either set up or acquired by previously
obscure businessmen and subsequently
became large concerns, or were large
already at the time when they were set
up. In the former case, their business
life (for the purpose of this paper) be-
gan when they became large concerns.
Since a large mass of small business es-
tablishments exists under capitalism,
some businesses may have operated long
before they became large establishments,
but the number of years when they
were operating In the market economy
is not counted.
II Genesis and Expansion
Although the Southeast Asian econ-
omy had a market sector in pre-colonial
times, it seems that it was underdevel-
oped compared with that in India and
China.1) Then it expanded somewhat in
the first two centuries of the colonial
period, but it was only after the mid
19th century that its growth accelerated
and a well-developed market economy
I) The market economy starts with market
exchange, so its history is long. The ques-
tion is how developed it was in pre-colonial
times, not whether it existed. At present,
it is difficult to believe that it was well
developed. As the market economy devel-
ops, the volume of transaction becomes
large and the nature of business gets
complex. As a result, a large quantity of
money is used, and the system of recording
transaction (such as accounting) develops.
At present, there is no evidence that there
was such development in the region cov-
ered in this paper.
appeared. Around that time, Southeast
Asia became more substantively inte-
grated into the global economic network,
as the result of the Industrial Revolu-
tion in the West, development of steam-
ships, and the opening of the Suez Ca-
nal. The region became a market for
the West's manufactured goods and a
supplier of raw materials and tropical
food products. To sustain and develop
this pattern of integration, Western cap-
ital came in, but mainly on a large
scale, so there was need for someone to
develop the market economy sector. For
the reasons of work ethic, know-how,
and/or networks, the Chinese came to
dominate this sector. So, the plural eco-
nomic structure emerged: the Western
merchants dominating in capitalism, the
Chinese in the market economy, and the
indigenous in the subsistence economy.
The Chinese, however, did not stay in
the market economy sector for long:
some began moving into capitalism. To
date precisely when this began is some-
what difficult. Yap Ah Loy's tin mines
In Kuala Lumpur employed several
thousand people. His business may qual-
ify as the first Chinese capitalistic insti-
tution in the region, but the reason he
was able to organize such a large scale
operation is that he was the head of a
secret society who resorted to violence
for the protection and expansion of his
business, so I am reluctant to consider
him as the first capitalist.2) But by the
2) Capitalism presupposes law and order, so
a capitalist institution specializes in eco-
nomic undertaking. Yap Ah Loy's business /'
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time of Chung Keng Kwee, law and or-
der had been established by the British
in Perak (the area of his operation),
though he used his position as the head of
a secret society for organizing tin min-
ing operations. His businesses qualifies
better as a capitalist institution than
Yap Ah Loy's.3)
The Chinese also moved into trading
and processing on a large scale. Lim
Peng Siang's Ho Hong Group (Ma-
laya), Oei Tiong Ham's Kian Gwan (In-
donesia), and Chin Teng's Kim Seng
Lee (Thailand) were among the earliest
which broke into these fields.4) Once the
flood gate opened, the Chinese began
moving into capitalism in an increasing
number and on a larger scale. They ex-
panded their interests in tin mining,
trading, and processing, and also diver-
sified into plantations, banking, insur-
ance, shipping, and finally manufacturing.
The growth of Chinese businesses has
not necessarily been smooth in the past
few decades, but Chinese capital has
come to dominate the capitalism of
Southeast Asia. One reason is that what
Western capital was doing was not ter-
ribly difficult to imitate. There is not
much high 'technology' involved in trad-
ing. Banking was more tricky, so some
burned their fingers badly, especially in
foreign exchange operation, but it did
~ does not qualify as a capitalist institution,
for the same reason vac does not. For
the life of Yap Ah Loy, see Middlebrook
[1951J.
3) For Chung Keng Kwee, see Godley [1981J.
4) For the Ho Hong Group, see Song [1984J;
for Kian Gwan, Panglaykim and Palmer
[1970J ; and for Chin Teng, Hong [1984J.
not take too long to master the neces-
sary know~how.5) Processing was not too
difficult to take over, either. This was
easiest in rice milling, whose technology
was relatively simple and in which there
was not much economy of scale.G) Rub-
ber processing was a little more compli-
cated, but not much more.?) Sugar and
some other processing required large cap-
ital, but as capital became more abun-
dant, the Chinese also moved into such
capital intensive processing (for exam-
ple, Kian Gwan).
More important, however, for the
growth of Chinese businesses In the
post independence period is the nation-
alistic policy of governments.8) Chinese
businesses were not treated as full-
fledged national capital in some countries,
but foreign businesses suffered more.
Since the indigenous were not able to
take over them, the Chinese filled the
vacuum.9) In these countries, to increase
the indigenous share in the economy,
the government became an important
5) For some of the problems the Chinese
faced in banking, see Wilson [1972J.
6) Modern rice milling was started by Western
merchants, but they were soon phased out
of this field, except East Asiatic Co.
7) The Chinese could not, however, start latex
production until postwar years. Lee Kong
Chian was one of its pioneers.
8) This can be seen most clearly in the rise
of Chinese banking in the postwar period.
In Malaysia, for example, British banks,
which used to dominate this field in the
prewar period, lost the dominant position
to Chinese banks.
9) For some time after Indonesia nationalized
Dutch rubber plantations. Singapore pro-
cessed and marketed the rubber from these
plantations. A large part of it seems to
have been smuggled out from Indonesia.
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element of domestic capital, but in the
private sector Chinese capital occupies
a more important position than indige-
nous or foreign capital.lO)
III Discontinuity
In the past several decades Chinese
businesses increased in number as well as
in size, but there is not much continu-
ity in individual businesses. Most of the
Chinese businesses in the prewar period
do not exist today. Ho Hong Group
(shipping and trading) , Kian Gwan
(trading, banking, and sugar produc-
tion), Loke Yew's and Eu Tong Sen's
tin mines, Dee C. Chuan (lumber trad-
ing), Cu Unjieng & Co. (textile trad-
ing), Yek Hua (general trading), Koe
Guan (shipping), Kim Seng & Co. (gen-
eral trading), Kim Seng Lee & Co.
(rice and saw mills), Tan Kah Kee &
Co. (rubber trading and processing)--
these are all gone today'!}) As late as
the 1950s and the early 1960s, we heard
10) Although foreign capital is important in
some manufacturing fields (especially where
there is a technology gap), it is a myth
that it still dominates the economy. The
situation varies somewhat by country and
sector, but for the economy of the ASEAN
region as a whole, Chinese capital is more
important than foreign capital. See Yoshi-
hara [1988: Chapter 3J.
II) Ho Hong, Kian Gwan, and Kim Seng
Lee were mentioned earlier in the text.
Dee C. Chuan, eu Unjieng & Co., and
Yek Hua operated in the Philippines, Kim
Seng & Co and Tan Kah Kee in Singa-
pore, Eu Tong Sen and Loke Yew in Ma-
laya, and Koe Guan in Malaya and south-
ern Thailand. References for Ho Hong,
Kian Gwan, and Kim Seng Lee were given
much about Ko Teck Kin, Heah Joo
Sian, and Tan Lak Sye in the rubber
circle of Singapore, but their businesses
are also gone. In their place, there are
many new ones. In Indonesia, all Chi-
nese businesses are the creation of the
past two decades. For example, the two
largest business tycoons of the country,
Liem Sioe Liong who owns the largest
conglomerate in Indonesia and William
Soeryadjaya who owns the Astra group,
were non-persons until the mid 1960s,12)
The same is true also of lesser tycoons
such as Go Swee Kie, Go Ka Him, and
The Ning King. Also in Malaysia, new
businesses dominate. For example, take
three Chinese businessmen who often
appeared in newspapers in the early
1980s; Tan Koon Swan, Koo Kay Peng,
and Robert Kuok. The first two were
In obscure existence in the late 1960s;
at this time, Robert Kuok was already
known but his prominence did not go
earlier. For Kim Seng & Co., see Song
[1 984J ; for Tan Kah Kee, the best English
sources would be the transcripts of Tan
Keong Choon and Tan Kok Kheng's testi-
mony available at Archives and Oral His-
tory Department in Singapore; and for
Koe Guan (as well as Eastern Smelting
and Eastern Shipping), Cushman [1986J.
On Eu Tong Sen, there is some informa-
tion in Song [1984J, and on his businesses,
in Gullick [1983J. Information on the rest
is scattered.
12) The Liem Sioe Liang Group (sometimes
called Salim Group) consists of the Bank
Central Asia Group, Tarumatex Group,
First Pacific Group (in Hong Kong), Sinar
Mas Inti Perkasa Group, Indostee1 Group,
Indomobil Group, and Waringin Kencana
Group. The Astra Group grew as the agent
of Toyota, and recently diversified into
plantations.
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back more than several years. Why then
isn't there much continuity in Chinese
businesses? Several possible reasons are
listed below.
1) The Ambivalent Attitude of Colo-
nial Government
Businesses get into trouble sometimes,
and whether they can survive or not at
this time depends on the government's
rescue operation. Recently, this was
demonstrated amply in the rescue of
Chrysler Corp. by the manifestedly laissez
faire Reagan Administration. More ex-
amples of this kind can be found in
the business history of Japan, where the
government has been more intervention-
ist. In the colonial period of Southeast
Asia, however, Chinese businesses could
not count much on the government
for help.
It is true that colonial government
was not completely hostile to Chinese
businesses. If it had been, they would
not have progressed as much as they
did. And under some circumstances, gov-
ernments came to the rescue of Chi-
nese businesses. For example, when the
Chinese Commercial Bank of Singapore
faced a run in 1914, the colonial gov-
ernment came to its support and fore-
stalled its bankruptcy [Wilson 1972:
33J. But the same government refused
to help when Tan Kah Kee got into
trouble in the early 1930s. He was caus-
ing trouble to the colonial government
by sending money to China to build
schools and also posing a threat to West-
ern merchants as a competitor in busi-
ness.t3) In general, Chinese businesses
were a Chinese affair in which the colo-
nial government did not want to inter-
vene. The Singapore government's res-
cue operation in 1914 was more of an
exception than a rule.
2) Discrimination
During the period of several decades
before the Pacific War, colonial govern-
ment policy was probusiness, based on
the laissez faire ideology that had come
to dominate in the West, under which
Chinese businesses prospered. This envi-
ronment, however, changed drastically
in some of the newly independent coun-
tries in the postwar period. Burma and
Vietnam rejected capitalism outright and
nationalized its institutions. Indonesia
went in a similar direction during the
past decade of the Sukarno adminis-
tration. The nationalization of Dutch
enterprises in late 1957 was the begin-
ning, and by the middle of the next de-
cade, all Western enterprises ceased to
exist in Indonesia.
I t was under this anti-capitalist set-
ting that the biggest Chinese business,
Kian Gwan, was nationalized. In this
nationalization, however, there was
strong anti-Chinese feeling involved. The
initiative came from a morbidly anti-
Chinese government official (Gunawan)
who came to dislike Kian Gwan when
he was in Semarang (the home base of
Kian Gwan). Later, when he became
Attorney General in Jakarta, he charged
13) The transcript of Tan Keong Choon~s
testimony, Archives & Oral History Depart-
ment (Singapore), Sept. 1981 [Singapore
n.d.: 123J. Tan Keong Choon is Tan Kah
Kee~s nephew.
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that the company had violated a foreign
exchange law, and confiscated it for
this offence.14) In the New Order pe-
riod, there was practically no Chinese
discrimination in the first several years.
Then in 1974, the pribumi policy was
initiated, but it did not have much ef-
fect on Chinese businesses, for the gov-
ernment was not seriously interested in
its implementation (at least, not in ap-
plying it to the capitalist sector).
In the Philippines, such discrimination
measures as the Retail Nationalization
Law (which required 100 percent Filipino
ownership for engaging In trade)
and the "Filipino-first" policy (in the
allocation of foreign exchange) caused
a great deal of difficulty for Chinese
businesses in the early postwar period.
The damage was, however, not so large
as in Sukarno's Indonesia. One reason
for this IS the fact that Philippine
discrimination was partly a matter of
legality: Those with citizenship did not
face much discrimination. For the rich
Chinese, it was possible to get naturalized,
and those who could not get naturalized
transferred their ownership to those who
had citizenship [Yoshihara 1985: 84-88].
Malaysia's New Economic Policy
(NEP) (started in the early 1970s) hit
Chinese businesses hard, especially
Chinese banks. The Chinese owners who
got fed up with government interference
sold their ownership to the Malaysian
14) Interview with Liem Tjwan Ling (Nov.
1985). Mr. Liem is the author of Raja Gula:
Dei Tiong Ham, Surabaya, the Author, 1979.
This information was also confirmed by
Panglaykim when I talked with him in
May 1986.
government or Bumiputra entrepreneurs.
UMBC, Kwong Yik Bank, and D & C
Bank are no longer Chinese-owned. In
the case of UMBC, the major shareholder
Chang Ming Thien, wanted to sell his
holding to another Chinese group (Multi-
Purpose Holdings), but this wasn't
allowed by the Malaysian government.IS)
There are banks which still remain
Chinese in Malaysia (for example, Pub-
lic Bank), so as in the case of the dis-
crimination in the Philippines in the
early postwar years, discriminatory mea-
sures were not insurmountable, but were
conducive to the decline of old and the
rise of new businessmen. Some estab-
lished businessmen were so used to the
business practices of the period when
there was no government interference
that they could not adjust themselves
to the change of environment. In the
Philippines, it was necessary to bribe
government officials in order to get
around discrimination. And under the
NEP of Malaysia, if they wanted to
succeed, the Chinese had to be able to
work with Bumiputras. In short, change
in the business environment required a
new type of businessmen. People like
Robert Kuok in Malaysia are such ex-
amples.
15) Gill [1985: 183J gives a slightly different
account, but he also discusses the problems
Multi-Purpose had with the Malaysian
government in taking over the bank. At
present, UMBC's controlling share is
owned by the state enterprise, Pernas.
Gill's book also discusses a number of
other Chinese businessmen in Malaysia.
Also see Gale [1985J.
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3) Loss of Political Patronage
Government intervention in the econ-
omy is extensive and arbitrary in South-
east Asia. It is sometimes justified by
citing Japan as an example of the pat-
tern of development based on govern-
ment intervention. But, partly as a legacy
of feudalism and partly as a result
of military competition, Japanese gov-
ernment intervention was more purpose-
ful and more subject to rules and re-
gulations than the government interven-
tion of the past few decades in South-
east Asia. In the region, rightly or
wrongly, one still gets an impression
that the government dominates the econ-
omy, allowing little room for indepen-
dence of the economy.
Under this environment, if one wants
to amass a fortune, the quickest way is
to become a favorite of a politically pow-
erful figure, and use this connection
for the advantage of his business. There
are numerous examples of this, ranging
from the bureaucratic capitalists during
the Chulalongkorn period to the crony
capitalists during the Marcos period.
Most of their businesses were, however,
so dependent on political patronage that
they declined after their patrons died or
lost political power.
The most recent example of this is
Lucio Tan of the Philippines. During
the martial law period, by becoming a
close associate of President Marcos, he
built up his business empire. He estab-
lished himself first in tobacco business
be~ore martial law, and then by using
his close ties with Marcos, went into
banking; and later, into beer produc-
tion.l6) There is no question that he is
a smart businessman, and in this re-
gard, he is different from other cronies
such as Silverio, Cuenca and Disini,
which is shown in the fact that while other
cronies' businesses had declined by the
time of Marcos' fall from power, his
businesses were still going strong. But
this was of no avail. President Aquino's
Commission on Good Government se-
questered his flagship, Allied Banking
Corp., judging that it was "ill-gotton"
wealth during the Marcos period.
Liem Sioe Liong is a crony of Presi-
dent Soeharto, but unlike Lucio Tan,
he is still a powerful businessman in
Indonesia. But when President Soeharto
goes, what will happen to his businesses?
Many other cukongs also have to worry
about the effects of a new alignment
of powers in the post-Suharto period.
4) Government Monopoly
The governments of Southeast have
made certain industries their mono-
polies and disrupted private businessed
engaged in such industries. This gov-
ernment intervention was a result of
anti-Chinese policy in some cases, but
16) Lucio Tan's success began around 1970
with Fortune Tobacco. In the mid 1970s,
he bought a bank in trouble (General
Bank) and changed the name to Allied
Banking Corp., which became one of the
top banks during the Marcos period. Un-
doubtedly, without the facilities given by
the Marcos government, the bank could
not have grown so rapidly. Then in the
early I 980s , he set up Asia Brewery and
challenged the monopoly of San Miguel in
beer. However, he has not been very
successful in this field.
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not always: it also arose from the abuse
of political power by politico-bureaucrats
who either wanted to gain from it
personally and/or had a misconception
of the role of government In the
economy.
In the modern period, Thailand pIO-
neered government monopoly; for sev-
eral years from the late 1930s, rice mil-
ling and trading, the major industry of
the country, was made a monopoly of
the state enterprise, Thai Rice Co., and
general foreign trading of another state
enterprise, Thai Niyom Panich Co.
After the People's Party lost power,
however, this policy was discontinued
[Sungsidh 1980J.
In the 1950s and 1960s, government
monopoly was in decline. Then in the
1970s, after martial law, the Marcos gov-
ernment renewed it under the pretext
of economic rationalization and termi-
nated the lives of a number of private
businesses. For example, when sugar
trading was made a government mono-
poly, Arca & Co., a sugar trading com-
pany founded by Antonio Roxas-Chua,
lost its business and soon ended its cor-
porate existence. Also during martial
law, a number of Chinese coconut oil
mills were taken over by another gov-
ernment monopoly, United Coconut
Mills (UNICOM).
In the past several years, the Indone-
sia government has been also playing a
monopoly game. This may have affected
some businesses negatively, but no busi-
nesses have yet disappeared for this rea-
son. Those which were negatively
affected were general importers, and
handled a number of "free" (non-
monpolized) goods.m The difference
between Indonesia and the Philippines is
found in the commodities monopolized.
In the case of the Philippines, they
were export commodities, while In
Indonesia they are imported commod-
ities. In export commodities, there were
a number of specialized processors and
traders.
5) Poor Management Structure
Problems arising from management
style would be best illustrated by con-
trasting the management styles of two
rubber magnates who were active in
Singapore in the early 1950s. One is
Tan Lark Sye and the other is Lee
Kong Chian. Tan Lark Sye's Aik Hoe
no longer exists today, whereas Lee
Kong Chian's Lee Rubber is still a
large concern.
There is no question that Tan Lark
Sye was a shrewd businessman SInce
he amassed a large fortune (and he
often donated money generously for the
cause of the Chinese community), but
he paid little attention to building an
organization. His management was of
one man style: he made all major deci-
sions. He had too much confidence III
himself, so he did not make efforts to
17) The import monopoly of Indonesia started
with cloves, and expanded to rice, sugar,
and more recently to plastic materials, tin
plates, cold rolled steel, and cotton. Even
the domestic distribution of some commod-
ities, namely PTA and methanol, which
began to be produced in the country, be-
came the monopoly of some government-
connected trading companies.
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develop managers.l8) Essentially, it was
a traditional Chinese management doing
a large business.
Lee Kong Chian was different. He
was convinced that in order to make
his business grow and make it competi-
tive with Western companies, he had to
introduce some Western management
practices. As part of this move, he dele-
gated power to promising persons, and
for the good work done, paid generous
bonuses. So, under him emerged several
competent managers; Lee Seng Peng
who managed the company's operation
in Kuala Lumpur and northern Malay-
sia, Soo Lian Tooi in southern Malay-
sia, Yeo Hong Lian in Indonesia, and
Lee In Tong in Thailand. They kept
the company going even after Lee Kong
Chian retired.
Among the Chinese, Lee Kong Chian
was an exception, whereas there were a
number of people like Tan Lark Sye.
Other Chinese businessmen may have
had better organizations than Tan Lark
Sye, but they were family-managed and
shared a common problem. That is,
they could not delegate much manage-
ment power to people outside the fam-
ily. While they were alive, being shrewd
businessmen as well as effective leaders,
they could keep large businesses going,
but after they died, since there was no
durable management structure, their
businesses declined.
But why couldn't they delegate power
18) The transcript of Tan Eng 100's testimony,
Archives & Oral History Department (Sin-
gapore).
to other people? Clearly, history has
something to do with it. For example, in
Japanese zaibatsu there was a great deal
of separation of management from own-
ership, despite a strong family tradi-
tion. Many of the large merchant houses
in the late Tokugawa period already
had a fairly well-developed management
structure, largely because they had a
long business history behind them: in the
case of some old houses which evolved
into zaibatsu in the modern period
(such as Mitsui and Sumitomo), their
history went back a few centuries. In
the process of their evolution, as a mat-
ter of survival, they developed a man-
agement structure which could cope with
business competition (under feudalism,
it was constrained in many ways, but
over generations, still effective in chang-
ing the fortune of a business family) .
Then in the modern period, newly estab-
lished houses (such as Iwasaki of Mi-
tsubishi) had to introduce a similar
structure if they wanted to compete with
old established houses. As a result, the
pattern of organization which came to
prevail in businesses is family ownership
and professional management.
But the problem does not seem to be
the matter of history alone. Although it
is difficult to make an objective compar-
ison, the Chinese seem to have suffered
more from cheating and other decep-
tions than the Japanese, possibly because
of lax enforcement of law (either in
colonial times or in the post-independence
period). If there is a great risk in get-
ting cheated by bringing outsiders into
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management, it becomes wise policy for
the family to keep management to them-
selves.
6) Equal Inheritance
In Western Europe and Japan, primo-
geniture came to be established as the
prevalent system of inheritance, and this
helped business continuity. For example,
it was the established policy of a large
Japanese merchant house to hand over
its business to one son (usually the el-
dest); other sons received some help in
becoming independent, but were barred
from inheriting the bulk of family
wealth. Under this system, there was no
tendency for wealth to dissipate over
generations and there was no risk of
family dispute in business take-over.
In the Chinese system of inheritance,
all sons have roughly equal rights, which
have created problems for business
continuity. If all sons are in business
and want to have their own businesses
after the father dies, instead of concen-
trating in one field, he may have to di-
versify to create enough number of busi-
nesses for his sons, thus sacrificing the
potential for his main business to grow
further. If he has built up a conglom-
erate from a purely business viewpoint,
after it is split among his sons, each
subgroup is smaller, and has less chance
to survive.
Even under the system of equal inher-
itance, it is possible not to split family
wealth, but in this case, too many sons
(and sometimes daughters) want to par-
ticipate in management. This is partly
because there are not enough attractive
professions outside business. Another
reason is that since there is a great deal
of cheating in financial reporting, it is
difficult for siblings to entrust manage-
ment to other brothers and be satisfied
with dividends to which they are entitled
as shareholders. But when there are
many family members in management,
the line of authority gets blurred, man-
agement top-heavy, and to make things
worse, they sometimes fight each other.
For example, the Tjong A Fie family
finally declined for this reason,19)
7) Short-term Time Horizon
Among many Chinese businessmen
there seem to be great urge to get rich
quickly.20) In speculation, one can make
a lot of money quickly, but there is the
danger of ruining one's business. In
early 1981, Dewey Dee fled the Philip-
pines, causing a financial crisis in the
country. He lost in speculation, and in
order to make up for it, he borrowed to
speculate again. He must have been a
bad speculator: by the time he ran
away, he had a debt of $83 million.2D
At this time, it was being said that his
case was the tip of an iceberg: many of
his Chinese friends were also speculators.
Another way to get rich quickly is to
19) Interview with Tjong Kwek Liong (Nov.
19, 1985). He is a son of Tjong A Fie's.
20) There is gambling everywhere, but in
reading materials on Chinese business in
Southeast Asia, one gets an impression
that there was more of it among rich
Chinese. In Singapore, it is said that there
was much gambling going on in Ee Hoe
Hean Club, and also in Tanjong Rhu Club.
21) See The Asian Wall Street Journal. April 22,
1981.
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make use of the stock market. Since it
is quite time consuming to develop a
business and get it listed on the stock
market (certain criteria have to be met
to be able to be listed), it is a short-cut
to buy a listed company in trouble, res-
urrect it somehow, use it for raising
capital on the stock market, and invest
this money in corporate acquisition. In
this, there is no real business develop-
ment, but a great deal of business tal-
ent gets mobilized for this strategy.
Sometimes, an unscrupulous businessman
manipulates the market or violates the
trust the shareholders place in his man-
agement. Recently, Tan Koon Swan
was arrested for these offences.
To borrow heavily for investment IS
another strategy to get rich quick--as
long as prices are going up. When prices
start coming down, however, this
strategy can cause business failure. In the
1970s, the ASEAN economy was boom-
ing, and many businessmen borrowed
heavily from banks, and invested in real
estate. But when the economy started
to stagnate in the early 1980s, they got
into trouble. They ended up with hotels,
high rise buildings, and land which they
could not market, while interest pay-
ments were piling up relentlessly. Kee
Yong Wee of Malaysia and Hendra
Rahardja of Indonesia gave in rela-
tively early. More failures are bound
to come.
The impression that there is no long-
term strategy in Chinese businesses is
strong because there are no Matsushitas
who have built up businesses over many
years on their own efforts.22) Many busi-
nesses In manufacturing industry In
Southeast Asia are the agents of foreign
manufacturers. For example, Tawon
Pornprapha of Thailand, Eric Chia, Loh
Boon Siew, and Tan Yuet Foh of Ma-
laysia, and William Soeryadjaya of In-
donesia are essentially the compradors
of Japanese auto manufacturers. They
made money by assembling and distrib-
uting Japanese cars, but when the
market got saturated and business ex-
pansion slowed down, they began diver-
sifying, usually into non-manufacturing.
Once the car business was stabilized,
they did not see much challenge in it,
being unable to do anything about the
technology. And also, it is too risky to
concentrate in such enterprises, since
their businesses would decline if J apa-
nese cars lose competitiveness or cannot
be supplied if for some reasons, foreign
exchange becomes unavailable. Hendra
Rahardja (who assembles Yamaha motor-
cycles In Indonesia) diversified In
the wrong direction in the wrong way:
he lost a lot of money by investing in
hotels in Singapore.
22) Several years ago, Brian Chang's Promet
in Singapore could qualify as an indepen-
dent manufacturing company (a maker
of oil equipment) with the ability to com-
pete in the international market, but like
many others, it also went into property
development and is now in trouble. The
decline of oil prices, which reduced oil ex-
ploration in the region, is of course, an
additional reason for Promet's trouble. At
the time of this writing, it is at the brink
of bankruptcy (Asian Wall Street Journal.
Sept. 11, 1986).
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IV Continuity
There are Chinese companies whose
history goes back to the prewar period.
For example, Malayan Insurance Co.,
La Tondena, and China Banking Cor-
poration of the Philippines, OCBC and
Lee Rubber of Singapore, Wang Lee
Bank of Thailand, and Ban Hin Lee
Bank and Cycle & Carriage of Malay-
sia. What distinguishes them from those
which have disappeared?
One should first note that there are
no Chinese businesses in Indonesia which
go back to the prewar period. For
some time after independence, anti-Chi-
nese feeling was strong there, so there
was hardly any Chinese business left at
the end of the Sukarno period. In the
other ASEAN countries, however, anti-
Chinese policy was not so disastrous as
in Indonesia. In Thailand, it was short
and half-hearted. Theoretically, the pe-
riod of discrimination lasted until 1957
when Sarit became the strongman, but
in practice, after the People's Party lost
power to the military in 1947, there was
no systematic discrimination against the
Chinese; as a matter of fact, some Chi-
nese businesses grew during this period.
In the Philippines, discrimination caused
problems, but it was not impossible to
overcome.
There has to be some distance kept
from the government, in order to avoid
possible persecution from the next one.
Some ties with the government are un-
avoidable where politics dominates the
economy, but to be too close to the
government is a bad long-term strategy.
Lucio Tan has lost his bank because
of his close connection with Marcos, but
the other Chinese businesses (for ex-
ample, China Banking Corp.) will not be
affected since there were no particularly
close relations between them and Marcos.
Also, where the head of the state is
elected, it is better not to get heavily
involved in election campaigns or to
become a chief financier of one candi-
date. If this candidate loses, the success-
ful candidate will regard him as an
enemy and mete out a retribution
against him. In the worst case, he has
to leave the country.
When it comes to the business side of
problem, it is difficult to detect any
tendencies. Concerning ownership, busi-
nesses may be family-owned (for exam-
ple, La Tondena), family-dominated
(DaB), or jointly-owned (for example,
China Banking Corp.). Management
may be family-dominated or left to pro-
fessionals. In a family business, the
owner family usually dominates manage-
ment, though some professionals are
always employed (especially in technical
fields). Also in a jointly-owned business,
at least one of the major owners is usu-
ally involved in management, often as
the chief executive officer (for example,
UOB). There are some exceptions, of
course. The Lee family leaves the man-
agement of Lee Rubber completely to
professional managers, and so do the
owners of OCBC.23) The former chairman
23) The management policy of OCBC may /'
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of OCBC, Tan Chin Tuan, held a few
percent share of the bank, but this was
not the reason that he was given the top
executive position. The present chair-
man, Yong Pung How, holds practically
no share of the bank.
It is not necessarily true that jointly
owned businesses are more long-lasting
or that separation of management from
ownership is necessary for long-term
survival. At least, these propositions
have not been true thus far. But one no-
tices that banks tend to be more long-
lasting.24) From· the beginning, banks
were usually joint-owned and manage-
ment more professionalized: the amount
of necessary capital for a bank was usu-
ally beyond the ability of one family
to raise, and since the financiers were
traditional Chinese businessmen, they
needed professional managers.25) From
~ have been influenced by Lee Kong Chian
who was involved in the formation of the
bank in the 1930s and also became its
largest shareholder in the early 1950s (held
about 20 percent of the shares) [Puthuc-
heary 1979: l34-l35J.
24) One should, however, keep in mind that
there were a number of bank failures.
The first Chinese bank in Malaya, Kwong
Yik Bank, got into trouble in the early
1910s (this is different from the Kwong
Yik Bank which exists in Malaysia today).
The three banks which merged to become
OCBC did so because they could not tide
over the problems they faced in the early
1930s. In Thailand, such prewar Chinese
banks as Soon Hok Seng Bank, Tan Pen
Choon Bank, and Thye San Bank; in In-
donesia, Batavia Bank, Fah Tung Chinese
Bank and Oei Tiong Ham Bank; and
in the Philippines, Wat Hung Bank and
Mercantile Bank of China--all of these
banks do not exist today.
25) Banks were different from pawnshops and
the example of such banks, one may
surmise that in the future, if businesses
want to continue to grow, more outside
capital have to be brought in and there
has to be greater separation of manage-
ment from ownership. But change in
these directions can be slow. In both
management and ownership, the family
will try to remain as the core. And if
it has to give up either, it will give up
management first. Even if outside capi-
tal is brought in, the family can keep a
controlling ownership for a long time
to come.
One institutional development which
helped a business to last long is that of
the stock market. Even if a family owns
a controlling interest, there are a few
advantages for the shares to be listed
on a well developed stock market.
Among these, the chief advantage is that
when shareholders become dissatisfied
with the present management, they can
transfer their holding to others through
the stock market, so that their dissatis-
other traditional financial Chinese institu-
tions. For the problems a Chinese bank
faced in its early years, see, for example,
Dick Wilson's history of OCBC. In most
of the prewar period, the general managers
of China Banking Corporation were Ame-
ricans (Manila Chronicle Business Report:
China Banking Corporation. August 16, 1970,
p.IO). To hire a foreigner as general
manager seems to have been quite common
in Chinese and other Asian businesses,
at least in their initial phases. When
a Chinese group set up Eastern Smelt-
ing Co. (a tin smelting company) in
Penang, they hired a foreign manager
[Cushman 1986: 73J. A number of sugar
mills in the Philippines were also managed
by foreigners (these were, however, owned
by Filipinos).
424 -124-
K. YOSHIHARA: The Problem of Continuity in Chinese Businesses in Southeast Asia
faction does not have to lead to dissolu-
tion of the business. In the case of a
family dispute, transfer of ownership
becomes easier from the dissatisfied party
to those in management or those who
support it, since objective prices are
indicated in the stock market. Without a
well developed stock market, an ob-
jective evaluation of shares is not clear,
so that when family dispute arises, it
can get locked up and take an ugly
turn. When there was a family dispute
in the Aw family, some members who
were not happy with the way its busi-
nesses (the major one was Haw Par
Brothers, which is known for the Tiger
Balm brand of medicine) were being
run sold their holding through the Singa-
pore stock market to a group which
wanted to take over the businesses.26)
The succession problem can be over-
come if the founder grooms his succes-
sor before he dies. In the case of Lee
Kong Chian, he chose one of his sons
(Lee Seng Gee) as his successor for the
rubber business (Lee Rubber) long
before he died (he retired from
rubber business in 1954, and died in
1967). In the case of Dei Tjie Sien (the
founder of Kian Gwan) , he chose Dei
Tiong Ham as his successor, while he
gave some property to the other son
(Dei Tiong Bing) and made him leave
the company. Dei Tiong Ham also lim-
ited the number of sons who could
stay in business; he chose two to be his
26) It was Slater Walker Securities (a British
company) which took over the Aw family's
businesses, but they were later bought back
by Wee Cho Yaw's OUB group.
main successors. Between the two, after
a while, Tiong Haw emerged as the new
head of the family, and remained so
until 1950 when he died suddenly of a
heart attack.27)
Even if brothers and brothers-in-law
are involved in management, if the new
patriarch has a controlling ownership,
he can impose his will on them, and fam-
ily disputes can be avoided. So, it is
important for the predecessor not only
to train his successor, but transfer con-
trolling interests to him. This can be
more easily done if it is planned well in
advance and if there are no tax and
legal problems to worry about.
From the family's point of view, It IS
important to continue to control its busi-
ness, and as a measure to insure this,
it seems to have become fashionable to
set up a foundation to which its hold-
ings are transferred (for example, the
Lee Foundation and the Shaw Founda-
tion). This has certainly prevented fam-
ily holdings from getting fragmented,
but there is no assurance that the busi-
ness the foundation controls will con-
tinue to prosper. In the 1920s, Tjong A
Fie also took this precaution, but his
business empire has disappeared since
then. When he was getting old, all of
his children were still small, and so in
his will, he left management to a Dutch
manager who had been working for
him. But since there was no effective
supervision on him, even though he was
mismanaging Tjong A Fie's estates,
27) For the line of succession in Kian Gwan,
see Liem [1979: especially chapter IJ.
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nothing was done about it.28) So, even if a
foundation is set up, there is still the
problem of effective management. The
family can supply it by getting directly
involved, or if they decide to leave it to
professional managers completely, they
have to choose good managers and su-
pervise them.
V How Chinese is Chinese Business
Discontinuity
Although there are some long-lasting
Chinese businesses in Southeast Asia,
when compared with a country like Ja-
pan, Chinese businesses have tended to
be short-lived. Most businesses which
were operating in the early years of this
century no longer exist today, and most
of those operating today are relatively
new. Section III listed several factors
which account for this: they are the
factors which either did not exist or
were not very relevant in the business
history of developed countries.
One can ask whether indigenous busi-
nesses are also short-lived for the same
reasons. This question is somewhat dif-
ficult to answer because there are not
enough long-established indigenous busi-
nesses, but one can answer it tentatively
as follows.
Many of the factors listed in section
III apply also to indigenous businesses.
For example, political retribution also
destroyed indigenous businesses. The
"palace" entrepreneurs at the end of the
28) Interview with Tjong Kwek Liong (Nov.
19, 1985).
Sukarno period and the crony capital-
ists during the Marcos period who suf-
fered under the new regimes were largely
indigenous businessmen. And, when
Marcos declared martial law, he de-
stroyed Eugenio Lopez (his brother was
a challenger to Marcos, and Eugenio
was his financier). Also, the succession
problem has plagued indigenous busi-
nesses (for example, the Affan brothers
of Indonesia). Furthermore, many indig-
enous businessmen wanted to get rich
quickly in an easy way, and subse-
quently got into trouble. For example, a
number of Bumiputra businessmen were
engaged in high finance in the 1970s,
and are now suffering the consequences;
and people like Silverio and Disini
ended their business careers by going into
a risky area of finance. But in the Phil-
ippines, where indigenous businessmen
began appearing much earlier than in
the other Southeast Asian countries,
there are a number of indigenous busi-
nesses whose history goes back to the
prewar period--and there are many
more of them than Chinese businesses.29 )
Why? In answering this question,
there is one basic fact about Chinese
businesses we have to keep in mind:
that is, the Chinese, being a minority
group who have often been subjected to
discrimination, feel insecure about their
pOSltlOn in society. How this fact has
affected the continuity of Chinese busi-
nesses cannot be fully documented here,
29) Some examples of the presently existing
Filipino companies set up in the prewar
period can be found in Y oshihara [1985:
Chapter 6J.
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but one of its direct effects is on the
time horizon. When there is discrimina-
tion or a possibility of discrimination in
the future, a long-term business strategy
becomes difficult. Under such a circum-
stance, the most reasonable thing to do
would be to make money as quickly as
possible (by resorting to speculation if
necessary) and invest a substantial por-
tion of it abroad, if not run away.
To a number of Chinese in regional
cities in Indonesia, the military who
control the state apparatus look more
like racketeers than like a legitimate
government institution. The Chinese
have been the target of violent attacks by
the Indonesians, so those who have tan-
gible assets are willing to pay contribu-
tions to the military if they can offer
protection. This arrangement of protec-
tion, however, takes the form of organ-
ized crime when the military directly
threatens the Chinese or indirectly through
inciting private anti-Chinese groups.
Many of the big Chinese businessmen
who are well-connected with the govern-
ment in Jakarta do not have such a
problem, and are greatly benefiting from
the government, but they too seem to
feel uncertain about their or their fami-
lies' future since there is an under-
current of anti-Chinese feeling in Indo-
nesian society. In Malaysia, the situation
IS not so bad as in Indonesia, but there
is also a feeling of insecurity and con-
cern about the future. Under such a
setting, a long-term business strategy is
difficult.
Discrimination, also, has indirect ef-
fects, preventing, for example, social in-
tegration, which seems to have affected
adversely the continuity of Chinese busi-
nesses in a roundabout way. For ex-
ample, the lack of social integration
may have been a major reason the Chi-
nese could not develop a public com-
pany like San Miguel Corp. And also,
relative to a comparable indigenous busi-
nessman, a Chinese businessman was at
disadvantage vis-a.-vis indigenous busi-
nessmen, in developing social relations
with major politicians and using these
for business development (this factor
becomes, of course, irrelevant in a
country like Indonesia where Chinese
businessmen are dominant).
In the prewar period, many Chinese
were transients in Southeast Asia; they
often sent money home and wanted to
go home eventually when they made
enough money. Did this fact affect nega-
tively the continuity of Chinese busi-
nesses? It may have done so to some
extent. For example, the investments of
"mandarin capitalists" in railways and
other businesses in China was not a wise
decision from the business point of
view (those which turned out to be pro-
fitable were confiscated in the late 1940s
when the Communist Party came to
power) .30) And also, it could be argued
that Tan Kah Kee's generous contribu-
tions to the cause of education in his
home country could have been kept as
an emergency fund for his business and
that if this had been done, he would
30) For investment in China by Nanyang
Chinese in the early years of this century,
see Godley [198IJ.
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have tided over the difficulties in the
early 1930s. One might argue, however,
that in any country, businesses con-
tribute money for social purposes. But
there is one major difference in the ef-
fects of such contributions between Chi-
nese businesses and, say, Japanese busi-
nesses. In the latter case, there are 'in-
vestment' aspects to such contributions,
and these might become useful when
they get into trouble. In the case of
Chinese business contributions, however,
there were little material benefits in re-
turn: when Chinese businesses got into
trouble, the Chinese government hardly
did anything.
The effects of the Pacific War are not
very clear. The relevance of the War
may be questioned by pointing out that
although Japanese businesses suffered
badly from the war, there are many
prewar businesses left. But the War can-
not be quickly brushed aside as irrele-
vant since its effects may have been im-
portant under certain circumstances. In
the Philippines, for example, many Chi-
nese businessmen had contributed money
to help the Koumintang government
fight against the Japanese military. So,
when the Japanese occupied the country,
there was retaliation.3n And the subse-
quent few years were difficult for most
Chinese businessmen. But many Filipino
businessmen were also anti-Japanese, and
suffered from the occupation. I t is not
clear whether the Chinese suffered more
than the Filipinos. But there is more
31) For the problems the Chinese faced during
the occupation, see Tan [1981J.
continuity in Filipino than in Chinese
businesses. This seems largely because
the Filipinos could get government
assistance to corporate rehabilitation
more easily than the Chinese. If so, the
more direct reason for the greater
discontinuity of Chinese businesses is
discrimination, and the Pacific War be-
comes merely a contributing factor.
So, in sum, one can state that if there
is anything Chinese about Chinese dis-
continuity, it arises mainly from the fact
that the Chinese are a minority group
which have been subjected to discrimi-
nation.
VI Concluding Comments
I have implicitly assumed thus far
that there is some value to business
continuity, but why? One can argue
that since there has been more business
continuity in the history of presently
developed countries, business continuity
is necessary for the ASEAN region if it
wants to develop. But specifically how
does it promote development?
If there is no continuity, there will be
a great deal of repetition of same mis-
takes, and as a consequence, there will
be much waste in the use of human and
capital resources. And when there is an
economy of scale, a large amount of
capital has to be mobilized, but this is
easier for a business which has some
capital as the result of past accumula-
tion and has a respectable reputation
from the past record. Furthermore, the
separation of management from owner-
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ship, however desirable it may be for
business development, cannot come in a
short time. If it is tried in a new busi-
ness, it tends to result in business fail-
ure. It can come only as the result of
adaptation to a competitive enVIron-
ment by trial and error over genera-
tions.
Some business failures are, of course,
healthy, for they serve as a warning to
the businesses which stop innovating.
But in the ASEAN region there have
been too many failures, so a major prob-
lem of business modernization today is
how to keep more businesses long-lasting.
This may appear to be a purely business
problem, but as pointed out above,
business continuity has been affected,
to a large extent, by non-business fac-
tors. After all, business is only a subset
of a greater set. So, modernization of
the subset is difficult without moderni-
zation in its complement.
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